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Fear, Irrationality, and Risk Perception
Henry L. Chambers, Jr.*
This brief commentary makes two points.' The first is that fear can play
multiple roles in any decision-making process. The second is that accurately
determining whether reactions to fear are irrational is a complex task. Though
neither point necessarily requires that symposium participants abandon their
positions, together they suggest that extreme care is necessary in developing
policy prescriptions based on the claim that fear can trigger irrationality.
I. FORMS OF FEAR
Many papers in this symposium treat fear as a precursor to irrational risk
perception. 2 If fear is only defined in that manner, its effect may appear lim-
ited to distorting thought processes and decision making. However, if fear is
considered to be related more generally to thrill, danger, and uncertainty
about the unknown, its effects can be neutral or positive.3 When viewed
broadly, fear can serve at least three different functions. Fear can be a com-
modity, fear can focus thoughts, or fear can trigger action.
A. Fear as Commodity
In carefully packaged forms, fear can be bought and sold like a com-
modity.4 For example, people will pay to ride roller coasters and other "thrill
rides" that are supposed to evoke fear. However, it is unclear why a roller
coaster should trigger fear. Surely the fear does not stem from the belief that
the rider might be injured as a result of the roller coaster's crash or malfunc-
tion. If that were a real concern, few likely would ride. Though some have
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond; formerly James S. Rollins Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
1. This commentary is adapted from remarks given on a panel at the Fear and
Risk in Times of Democratic Crisis conference at the University of Missouri-
Columbia School of Law on February 20, 2004.
2. See, e.g., Neal Feigenson et al., Perceptions of Terrorism and Disease Risks:
A Cross-national Comparison, 69 Mo. L. REv. 991 (2004); Paul Slovic, What's Fear
Got to Do with It? It's Affect We Need to Worry About, 69 Mo. L. REv. 971 (2004)
(suggesting that in some situations fear may impede common sense and straightfor-
ward analysis).
3. See Rachel F. Moran, Fear: A Story in Three Parts, 69 Mo. L. REv. 1013
(2004) (providing various explanations of fear's effects).
4. Indeed, fear is currently bought and sold in some television shows. See, e.g.,
Fear Factor (NBC television broadcasts, 2003-04 broadcast season). Fear Factor
contestants must overcome their fears to win money.
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died riding roller coasters,5 such accidents are unexpected and not the realiza-
tion of an accepted risk in riding. Nonetheless, the greater the fear or thrill
generated, the more some want to ride.
Even when fear itself is not sold, it can be instrumental in selling other
products. For example, life insurance purchases may stem from fear. Though
life insurance does not eliminate the fear of death, it minimizes the fear that
one's family will be destitute as a result of one's death. Given the relatively
low risk of early death among the young and healthy, and the concomitant
low risk that one's family will face the early death of a member and become
destitute as a result, life insurance for the young and healthy would appear to
be an irrational expenditure of money. 6 However, there is nothing irrational
about spending even a significant amount of money to lower the risk of a
relatively unlikely occurrence if the pain that would accompany the unlikely
occurrence is quite high. One might still overpay for insurance, but such
overpayment reflects insufficient market information-i.e., that the insurance
could have been purchased more cheaply elsewhere-rather than irrational
risk perception. Simply, that fear is a part of the decision to buy life insurance
does not make the purchase irrational. Indeed, when fear is packaged as a
commodity or has an effect on the purchase of a commodity, it can be-
though is not always-assessed or valued in a highly rational way.
B. Fear as Focuser
Fear can also make one focus on what really matters and how much or
how little something is valued. Indeed, fear may initiate a thought process
that would never have occurred otherwise. For example, I have had a number
of discussions with various law professor colleagues about keeping office
doors open or closed when speaking with students. Some colleagues have told
me that they always keep their doors open because they are afraid that untrue
allegations of harassment or misconduct could accompany closed-door stu-
dent meetings. Convinced that such unfounded allegations could ruin their
careers, they have reached their decisions after thinking (often for the first
time) about the costs and benefits of requiring that all student meetings be
open-door. Usually, their consideration includes why professors meet with
5. See, e.g., Gary Gentile, Coroner Says Disneyland Coaster Rider Bled To
Death, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Walnut Creek, Cal.), Sept. 11, 2003, at 4; Connie
Page, Six Flags Ride Reopens, A Month After Fatal Fall, BOSTON GLOBE, May 30,
2004, at B4; see also Kimberly Atkins & Bob Fredericks, Girl Killed on Playland
Ride, JOURNAL NEWS (Westchester County, N.Y.), May 23, 2004, at IA.
6. The likelihood that one's family would become destitute if the family's pri-
mary breadwinner died might be high. However, the probability that both the primary
breadwinner will die and the family would become destitute as a result of the death is
necessarily lower than the mere probability that the primary breadwinner will die.
7. In this way, fear can be likened to a campaign contribution that causes a
politician to focus on one issue rather than another.
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students, whether such meetings should occur if they cannot be conducted in
an open-door setting, and the general nature of relationships between students
and professors. However one feels about the open-door/closed-door issue, the
discussion-certainly fueled or triggered by fear which itself may be irration-
ally assessed-is a fruitful one that may force professors to rethink and
strengthen their relationships with students.
C. Fear as Trigger
As a number of this symposium's contributors suggest, fear can appear
to trigger seemingly irrational actions from citizens, courts, and legislatures
alike.8 Indeed, particularly well-designed experiments may appear to prove
that irrational thought processes accompany fear.9 However, this effect may
be similar to the effect that any overemphasized factor may have in a thought
process. For example, love, joy, pain, and retribution can all trigger seem-
ingly irrational thought processes. However, what appears irrational from one
perspective may be highly rational from another perspective.
For example, many may deem the purchase of an expensive engagement
ring to be a highly irrational act. At best, an engagement ring is a symbol of
love, not love itself. A significant expenditure of money on a symbol of love
by an impecunious but deeply loving couple may appear to be irrational.
Nonetheless, the purchase and gift of an engagement ring may be considered
highly rational. First, it arguably demonstrates the kind of seemingly irra-
tional spending that supposedly accompanies love, thereby confirming the
existence of love. Second, one might never convince one's putative spouse to
get married until an engagement ring has been purchased. Like love, fear may
trigger irrational actions or rational actions that simply appear irrational.
The comments above note three forms that fear can take. Rather than
suggest that fear necessarily leads to rational decision making, these com-
ments suggest that a one-size-fits-all vision of fear as invariably a trigger of
irrational risk perception is too narrow. As importantly, they suggest that fear
may be unexceptional, as it may affect thought processes no differently than
other factors or emotions.
II. THE TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF FEAR
Though fear can have the same effect on decision making as other emo-
tions, it may have a greater capacity to change us and, in the process, convert
acts that seemed irrational in the past into those that appear rational today.
Simply, fear can transform us in ways that fundamentally alter how we per-
ceive our world. There's A Nightmare in My Closet, a wonderful children's
8. See, e.g., Slovic, supra note 2, at 984-89.
9. See, e.g., Feigenson, et al., supra note 2, at 995-99.
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book, provides insight on the transformative power of fear.'0 In the book, a
child plans to vanquish the nightmare that lives in his closet. In the process of
facing and embracing his fear/nightmare, he realizes that his fear was not so
scary after all. Indeed, literally embracing the nightmare gives the child an
opportunity to be nurturing and caring toward that which had scared him.
Once he faces his first nightmare, the other nightmares in his closet are no
longer scary. They are merely problems to be managed. The book suggests
that facing and overcoming fear literally changes how the little boy looks at
his surroundings. This lesson is well worth learning or relearning at any age.
Of course, the events of September 11, 2001, may have had a transfor-
mative effect on us as a society. The fears triggered and faced on that day
literally changed many of us. The result may be that our definition of rational-
ity has changed as well. Indeed, many scenarios that may have seemed irra-
tional before September 11 th are now routinely contemplated. Similarly,
courses of action that may never have been taken before September 11 th have
been or may yet be taken." What qualifies as rational is different today than
what qualified as rational before September 11 th. Though the reactions of
those first transformed by fear may have seemed irrational to the majority at
first glance, those reactions may come to define rationality if society as a
whole is ultimately transformed by the same fears.
III. FEAR AND DEMOCRATIC CRISIS
Given that this symposium focuses on Fear and Risk in Times of De-
mocratic Crisis, I would be remiss if I did not very briefly mention race, risk
perception, perceived irrationality, and democracy. Some who suggest that
fear results in inaccurate or irrational risk perception seem to believe that
individuals overestimate known or knowable risks and act irrationally based
on those overestimations. However, whether a risk has been misperceived or
overstated may depend on how a risk is defined. For example, the risks I face
as a black man differ from those faced by others who are not black men. My
fears stem from risks I face and derive in part from incidents in which I or my
friends have been involved; they are likely different than the fears of those
who are not black men. 2 If my experiences are deemed exceptional (and they
are somewhat exceptional or atypical because they are experiences of a black
10. See MERCER MAYER, THERE'S A NIGHTMARE IN MY CLOSET (1968).
11. Certain interrogation strategies approved in the wake of the War on Terror-
ism may fall into this category. See Edward Epstein, Interrogating POWs Defended-
Rumsfeld Says Rules Meet Geneva Pact, S.F. CHRONICLE, May 13, 2004, at A15
(noting methods of interrogation that apparently have been approved by U.S. govern-
ment officials); Amanda Ripley, The Rules of Interrogation: It's a Murky Business,
But Some Methods Work Better Than Others, TIME, May 17, 2004, at 44 (same).
12. Indeed, the notion that different people, even those who appear similar, may
have different fears and experiences is captured in the title and flavor of a popular
novel. See BEBE MOORE CAMPBELL, YOUR BLUES AIN'T LIKE MINE (1995).
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man in a predominantly non-black land), my reaction to them may be deemed
to be based on irrational or inaccurate risk perception. Many in the minority
community and some in the majority community will deem my fears and the
precautions I take against bad outcomes rational because they may share the
same fears or appreciate them. However, if the majority of my fellow citizens
deem my fears to be irrational or based on faulty risk perception, legislators
may have little incentive to act on my fears. Because the fears of minorities
may be deemed exceptional or non-representative and therefore easily dis-




Fear may not always be rational and may in fact lead to irrational behav-
ior. However, we must be vigilant when labeling fear and actions triggered by
fear as irrational. Improperly deriding fear as anti-rational may stem from a
lack of recognition that competing value systems or desires may yield differ-
ent outcomes. For example, consider what a standard downward-sloping
demand curve tells us about people:




The upper left portion of the demand curve (D) represents a small number of
people who are willing to pay a substantial amount for Good A, for which
most people would only pay far less. The people in the upper left portion of
the demand curve may be irrational, but they cannot be deemed irrational
13. Indeed, the ethnicity of who complains may affect whether the complaints
are taken seriously. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS
152 (1991) ("It may be different when someone white is describing need. Shorn of the
hypnotic rhythmicity that blacks are said to bring to their woe, white statements of
black needs suddenly acquire the sort of stark statistical authority that lawmakers can
listen to and politicians hear. But from blacks, stark statistical statements of need are
heard as strident, discordant, and unharmonious. Heard not as political but only
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merely because they are willing to pay far more for Good A than most. They
may have different sets of desires or values vis-A-vis Good A than most (or
substantially larger bank accounts than most). Even if fear pushed those con-
sumers to the upper left portion of the demand curve for Good A, e.g., flight
insurance or gas masks, it is unclear that they are necessarily any less rational
than those on other segments of the demand curve for Good A or than con-
sumers who occupy the upper left portion of any demand curve.
That a person acts outside of the mainstream in assessing or reacting to
fear does not make him irrational. Fear may drive one person to take one ac-
tion and drive another person to take another more drastic action. If both ac-
tions are rational, fear has not triggered irrationality, though the temptation is
to deem the more drastic action irrationally driven by fear. If the different
responses are based on the different values or preferences of the two people,
ascribing irrationality to one person's action may be inappropriate.
One must be careful in labeling fear or reactions to fear as irrational
even when evaluating a person's reactions only by reference to the person's
internal value system. That a person is willing to pay a significant amount to
eliminate a small risk but seems unwilling to pay a smaller amount to elimi-
nate a significantly larger risk may not necessarily make him irrational, de-
pending on how the person processes the risk or whether contemplating the
risk transforms the person and how he rationally evaluates the risk. A truly
irrational response to fear occurs when an individual judges a fear or its risk
reasonably, then takes an irrational action to meet the judgment. That is, in
order for a response to be irrational, fear must deform a rational thought proc-
ess into an irrational one rather than transform one rational thought process
into a different rational thought process. Though fear can presumably trans-
form a rational thought process into an irrational one, this may occur in far
fewer circumstances than suggested at this symposium.
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